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COMMENTS
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE PRIVATE
CLUB: THE INSTALLATION OF A "THRESHOLD"
TEST TO LEGITIMIZE PRIVATE CLUB
STATUS IN THE PUBLIC EYE
I. INTRODUCTION
The most natural privilege of man, next to the right of acting for
himself, is that of combining his [energy, ideas and dreams] with
those of his fellow creatures and of acting in common with them.
The right of association therefore appears to me almost as inaliena-
ble in its nature as the right of personal liberty.... Nevertheless, if
the liberty of association is only a source of advantage and prosper-
ity to some nations, it may be perverted or carried to excess by
others, and from an element of life may be changed into a cause of
destruction.1
For more than three decades,2 courts have recognized a right to associ-
ate freely with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, eco-
nomic, educational, religious, and cultural objectives.3 Recently, the
Supreme Court has crystallized two distinct aspects of freedom of associa-
tion: freedom of intimate association and freedom of expressive association.
In one line of cases, the Court has concluded that the right to associate
receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty.4 In an-
other line of cases, the Court has recognized a right to associate for the
purpose of engaging in protected first amendment activities such as speech,
assembly, petition for redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.5
1. 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 196 (1963). The desire to join with
others to accomplish goals has been recognized for almost 150 years, as evidenced in the works of
de Tocqueville.
2. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298
(1969); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Douglas, The Right of Associ-
ation, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1361, 1361 (1963) ("The right of association is closely related to the
right to believe as one chooses and to the right of privacy in those beliefs."). See generally The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 59 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (Justice Harlan proclaimed that
"[n]o government has ever brought, or ever can bring, its people into social intercourse against
their wishes.").
3. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
4. See infra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
5. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18; see infra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
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The right to freedom of association has been a hallmark of equality.
Nonetheless, a conflict exists in the context of private clubs between indi-
viduals working toward open membership and access, and groups seeking
to limit membership and access to selected individuals.6 The extent to
which the government may constitutionally regulate the access and oppor-
tunities offered by private clubs is one of the most controversial issues in-
volved in this conflict.7
At present, there is no single, well verbalized definition of the phrase
"private club." 8 Nevertheless, the words "private club" are familiar and
easily understood. Since most laws inadequately define "private club,"
courts have taken an ad hoc rather than a conceptual approach toward dis-
tinguishing truly private clubs from those which are not in fact private, by
emphasizing the importance of various characteristics which most, but not
all, private clubs generally possess. 9
Attempts to create a uniform standard began on July 2, 1964, when
Congress passed Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, with its public
accommodation provision which forbids certain facilities, clubs or organiza-
tions from denying full and equal rights to any individual.1" The public
accommodation provision, specifically Section 2000a of Title 42 of the
United States Code,"1 provides an exemption for clubs that meet the qualifi-
cations of a private club. Although this legislation provides the primary
means for protecting the right to expressive association of historically disad-
6. See, e.g., Daniel, 395 U.S. at 308; Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of the Elks, 382
F. Supp. 1182, 1195 (D. Conn. 1974); Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1157 (S.D. Tex.
1970).
7. See, e.g., Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 541-44
(1987); Kiwanis Int'l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 806 F.2d 468, 477 (3d Cir. 1986); see also Note,
Private Club Membership - Where Does Privacy End and Discrimination Begin?, 61 ST JOHN'S L.
REV. 474 (1987).
8. The term "private club" is defined differently in each state. According to an interpretation
elicited during a congressional debate, a private club is a "bona fide social, fraternal, civic or other
organization which selects their [sic] own members." 110 CONG. REC. 7407 (1964) (statement of
Sen. Magnuson). Other interpretations have included size, location, and dues paid as factors asso-
ciated with private clubs. For a discussion of state public accommodation statutes, see infra notes
46-84 and accompanying text.
9. Determining if a club is private is "not an inference discoverable from 'experience with the
mainsprings of human conduct,'[sic] but an applicable legal standard whose dimensions must
conform to the legislative purpose that prevailed at its inception." United States v. Richberg, 398
F.2d 523, 526 (5th Cir. 1968). If this were not so, "the meaning of 'private club' might change
with each new case, and the body of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e)), fall victim to its
own protean exception." Id.
10. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 201, 78 Stat. 243 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1982)).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1982); see also infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text for examples
of state private club exemptions.
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vantaged groups, 12 courts are still burdened by the unestablished parame-
ters of the private club exemption. 13
This Comment will begin with a discussion of what freedom of associa-
tion is, where it comes from, and why it exists. It will also examine the
effect that the private club exemption has on club members, as well as those
excluded from membership. Next, this Comment will review federal legis-
lative regulations pertaining to private club discrimination, and then shift
its focus to attempts by states to limit discrimination through public accom-
modation statutes. Finally, this Comment will present a "threshold" analy-
sis of private club status for judicial use to produce more thorough, fair, and
well-reasoned results.
II. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
A. Basic Principles
It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the "lib-
erty" assured by the [first amendment and] the Due Process Clause
of the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment ....
Freedom of association is a fundamental constitutional right insofar "as
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is concerned."' 5 The
right to associate freely with others for social as well as political and busi-
ness purposes has been a well recognized characteristic of equality in the
United States. 6
12. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 624.
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a).
14. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (footnotes omitted). The
Supreme Court, in this 1958 decision, recognized and proclaimed for the first time a freedom
which had been dormant through years of constitutional development. Although freedom of ex-
pression is not mentioned in the Constitution, it is nothing new. It seems reasonable to conclude,
from a study of past developments and present decisions, that the right to associate is not limited
to the "spreading of ideas," but includes association to other areas as well. See generally C. RICE,
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (1962).
15. See C. RICE, supra note 14, at 176; see also Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460 ("Effective advo-
cacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably en-
hanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the
close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly.") (footnotes omitted). See generally
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937).
The Supreme Court initially treated freedom of association as a derivative and ancillary to
freedoms of speech and assembly. Later, the Court recognized freedom of association as a consti-
tutionally protected right of association. See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 461.
16. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (negative effects of exclusion of
minorities on their self-image and achievement); see also Goodwin, Challenging the Private Club:
Sex Discrimination Plaintiffs Barred at the Door, 13 Sw. U.L. REV. 237, 271 (1982); Note, supra
note 7.
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What are the general principles of association which prevail in a demo-
cratic society? We must begin with the individual, for it is he or she who is
the ultimate concern of social order. His or her interests and first amend-
ment rights are paramount in American society. Freedom of association is,
therefore, a valuable instrument used to give greater depth and scope to an
individual's needs, aspirations and liberties.17
In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,18 the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged the fundamental right to associate for the purpose of the advance-
ment of such needs, interests and goals by overruling a district court order
that required the NAACP to provide Alabama with a complete list of
names and addresses of all NAACP members in Alabama. The Court con-
cluded that compelling disclosure of the membership lists would have an
unjustifiably negative effect on the NAACP's ability to collectively foster
and implement its constitutionally protected beliefs. Further, disclosure
would cause members to withdraw from the Association and dissuade
others from joining out of fear of the consequences resulting from the expo-
sure of these beliefs. 19
It is ironic that even though freedom of association has been recognized
as a protected penumbra right of the first amendment, the Supreme Court
has yet to define its boundaries.2" Thus, courts are continuously confronted
with the task of balancing two very different interests. On the one hand,
courts recognize that the conduct of an "association"21 is likely to create
results that are unique to the character of an organization rather than an
individual. Through the accumulation of resources, the focusing of effort,
as well as the actions of the organization, an association may achieve objec-
tives far beyond those achievable by individual effort, and which are quali-
17. Note, United States Jaycees v. McClure: Private Organizations and the Right of Associa-
tion - How Far Does Constitutional Protection Extend, 17 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1535 (1984).
18. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
19. Id. at 462-63 (The NAACP demonstrated that in the past, revelation of the names and
addresses of the members "exposed them to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of
physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility." The Court recognized that in
order for an individual to realize his own capacities or stand up to the institutional forces that
surround him, it has become almost essential that he join with others of like mind in pursuit of
common objectives.). In later cases, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the freedom to associate
applies to the beliefs all shared. In Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974), for
example, the Court held that "[iut tends to produce the diversity of opinion that oils the machinery
of democratic government and insures peaceful, orderly change." Id. at 575.
20. See Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 2
(1964) ("The constitutional source of 'the right of association,' the principles which underlie it,
the extent of its reach, and the standards by which it is applied have never been clearly set
forth.").
21. The term "association" used in this context means "an organization of people: SOCI-
ETY." THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 57 (1974).
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tatively different.22 On the other hand, individual rights guaranteed by the
United States Constitution must be protected and upheld as the law of the
land by the courts under its authority.23
B. Two Aspects of Freedom of Association
Freedom of association has been viewed from two distinct perspectives:
freedom of intimate association and freedom of expressive association.24
The majority in Roberts v. United States Jaycees,25 cautioned that "the na-
ture and degree of constitutional protection afforded freedom of association
may vary depending on the extent to which one or the other aspect of the
constitutionally protected liberty is at stake in a given case. "26
1. Freedom of Intimate Association
Intimate association is a part of personal liberty that is guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights. Because the Bill of Rights is designed to secure individ-
ual liberty, it must protect the formation and preservation of certain kinds
of highly personal relationships from excessive state interference.2 7  Such
constitutional protection reflects the realization that individuals draw much
of their emotional enrichment from close ties with others.2"
22. See generally supra note 19.
23. The United States Constitution provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Gov-
ernment for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
24. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984).
25. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
26. Id. at 618.
27. Id. The Bill of Rights is designed to secure individual liberty. See U.S. CONST. amends.
I-X. Historically, courts have afforded the preservation of certain highly personal relationships a
great deal of protection from unjustified governmental interference. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (right to educate one's children as one chooses); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (right to study the German language in a private school).
Why is there the protection for intimate relationships? Courts realize that individuals draw
much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with others which allow them to develop their
own individual identity. See, e.g., Roberts, .468 U.S. at 619; Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255
(1978); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844
(1977); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977).
Family relationships involve deep attachments and commitments to a relatively small number
of people. Members of these groups share intimate thoughts, ideas, experiences and beliefs. These
intimate groups often maintain a certain amount of seclusion from the rest of society to maintain
the strong, personal relationship. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
28. See id. at 619; Carey, 431 U.S. at 684-86.
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The personal relationships that exemplify these considerations include
the creation and maintenance of a family,2 9 childbirth,3 ° raising and educa-"
tion of children,3 and cohabitation with one's relatives.32 Generally, fam-
ily relationships involve deep attachments and strong commitments. They
are usually distinguished by such attributes as smallness, a high degree of
selectivity to maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical
aspects of the relationship.33 Relationships with these types of qualities are
likely to exhibit the elements that have led to an understanding of freedom
of association as a component of personal liberty.
2. Freedom of Expressive Association
Freedom of expressive association is derived from the first amendment
guarantees of free speech and peaceable assembly.34 The freedom to associ-
ate with others "in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic,
educational, religious and cultural ends" insures the constitutional protec-
tion of those rights enumerated in the first amendment. 35
The right to associate for expressive purposes is not absolute. Such
rights may be infringed upon by regulations which serve a compelling state
29. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1978) (state statute requiring residents who
were responsible for support of a minor child to seek court approval prior to marriage was held
unconstitutional).
30. Carey, 431 U.S. at 684-86.
31. Smith, 431 U.S. at 844.
32. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) (plurality opinion) (zoning
ordinance prohibiting non-family members from residing in household violated residents' right of
free association by regulating persons designated as family).
33. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
34. The Constitution guarantees freedom of association of this kind "as an indispensable
means of preserving other individual liberties." Id. at 618; see also Citizens Against Rent Con-
trol/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981).
"According protection to collective effort on behalf of shared goals is especially important in
preserving political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression from suppression
by the majority." Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622; see, e.g., NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co., 458
U.S. 886, 907-09 (1982) (organized boycott of white merchants is considered protected expres-
sion); Gilmore, 417 U.S. at 575 (permitting an injunction barring a city from according exclusive
use of public recreational facilities to segregated private schools) (The Gilmore Court noted that
the "very exercise of freedom to associate by some may serve to infringe that freedom for
others."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-85 (1965) (right to privacy in marital rela-
tionship); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (NAACP's right to solicit civil rights litigation
essential to free expression); Patterson, 357 U.S. at 462 (group membership list need not be dis-
closed if result would have a detrimental effect on freedom of association); see also Raggi, An
Independent Right to Freedom of Association, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 1 (1977) (freedom of
association is "little more than a shorthand phrase used by the Court to protect traditional first
amendment rights of speech and petition as exercised by individuals in groups").
35. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
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interest, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved
through less restrictive means. 6
Since at least 1958, American courts have been called on to balance the
interests of groups seeking to invoke the right of association against those
who, instead, profess "equality."37 "Determining the limits of state author-
ity over an individual's freedom to enter into a particular association...
unavoidably entails a careful assessment of where that relationship's objec-
tive characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate to the
most attenuated of personal attachments."38 To determine whether an as-
sociation warrants constitutional protection, courts have considered factors
such as size, purpose, selectivity, and whether others are excluded from
critical aspects of the relationship.39 State legislatures have incorporated
these factors into their definitions of "private clubs" to resolve the battle
between conflicting interests. g°
III. BROAD LIMITS OF THE PRIVATE CLUB EXEMPTION
A. Federal: Private Club Exemption
1. Purpose of the Exemption
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 196441 was enacted in part to
"'[re]move the daily [insult] and humiliation involved in discriminatory de-
36. See Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel La Follette, 450 U.S. 107,
124-25 (1981).
37. See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 449.
38. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620 (citing Runyon v. McCray, 427 U.S. 160, 187-89 (1976) (Powell,
J., concurring)).
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 211, 215, 505
N.E.2d 915, 916, 513 N.Y.S.2d 349, 350 (1987), aff'd, 487 U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988) (New
York City law prohibiting discrimination by private clubs which provide benefits to non-members
held constitutional); Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 54
(1987) (Rotary International was required to allow women members into the local club); Kiwanis
Int'l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 806 F.2d 468, 477 (3d Cir. 1986) (Kiwanis International's re-
fusal of woman's membership in local club upheld), rev'g, 627 F. Supp. 1381 (D.N.J. 1986).
41. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 201, 78 Stat. 243 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1982)). The Public Accommodation Statute provides as follows:
§ 2000a. Prohibition against discrimination or segregation in places of public
accommodation
(a) Equal access. All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of pub-
lic accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the
ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.
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nials of access to facilities ostensibly open to the general public.' "42
Although this Act does not "apply to a private club or other establishment
not in fact open to the public,"43 it seeks to avoid the calculated expression
of a continuing and pervasive policy practiced by members of a club to
deter and discourage use of the facilities by minorities.' Therefore, in or-
der for an organization or group to fall under the private club exemption, it
must meet certain prerequisites set forth in the statute and interpreted by
the courts.
2. Judicial Interpretation of the Public Accommodation Act
The Public Accommodation Act does not clearly define the degree of
privacy an organization must establish in order to satisfy the requirement
that it is not in fact open to the public. 4 6 Courts have struck down efforts to
come under the private club exemption as a means of avoiding the applica-
tion of the public accommodation statute, 47 as exemplified in Daniel v.
42. United States v. Jordan, 302 F. Supp. 370, 379 (E.D. 1969) (quoting Daniel v. Paul, 395
U.S. 298, 307-08 (1969)); see also Hearings on H.R. 7152 Before the House Comm. on Rules, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1964) (statement of Rep. Cellar).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1982). For complete exemption, see supra note 41 and accompany-
ing text.
44. See Jordan, 302 F. Supp. at 379. The Jordan court struck the "private club" status of
Landry's Private Dining Club, Inc. even though it was not in itself a direct denial of service to
minorities. The court found that the creation of the "club" was designed to "curtail at the very
inception any possible attempt by Negroes to enjoy the facilities of the restaurant." Id.
45. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (The operations of the organization or establishment must
"affect commerce" or be supported by "state action" and must be one "which serves the public.");
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(l)-(4) (organization or establishment must be a public accommodation
within the terms of the Act); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (organization or establishment must not be a
private club or other establishment which is "not in fact open to the public," unless the club
facilities are made available to patrons of a non-exempt public accommodations).
46. Sen. Magnuson expressed his concern with the current interpretation of the Act:
The clubs exempted by § [2000a(e)] are bona fide social, fraternal, civic, and other organi-
zations which select their own members. No doubt attempts at subterfuge or camouflage
may be made to give a place of public accommodation the appearance of a private organi-
zation, but there would seem to be no difficulty in showing a lack of bona fides in those
cases.
110 CONG. REC. 7407 (1964) (statement of Sen. Magnuson).
47. In United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 773 (Minn. 1981), the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that because the United States Jaycees admits women to become "associate"
members of the organization, "it has given an open invitation to virtually anyone to become a dues
paying individual or associate member." Id.; see also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172
(1976) (Court held that two private schools which refused admission to blacks could not qualify as
private clubs because their educational services "were advertised and offered to members of the
general public"); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973) (Court con-
cluded that a club did not qualify for the private club exemption when it was a swimming pool
association open to every white person residing within a designated geographic area).
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Paul.48 In Daniel, defendants operated an outdoor recreational facility for
whites only. Following the passage of Title II of the Civil Rights Act in
1964, the defendants referred to the facility as a private club and required
patrons to pay a twenty-five cent membership fee, for which they received a
membership card entitling them to enter the premises for an entire season
and use additional facilities upon payment of additional fees. The Court
found the membership drive to be "no more than a subterfuge designed to
avoid coverage of the 1964 Act,"4 9 since membership privileges had been
routinely extended to 100,000 whites, and just as routinely denied to all
blacks. The Court concluded that the facility was a public accommodation
under the Act.
3. Legislative Debate Surrounding Title II
The initial version of the Public Accommodation Act exempted "bona
fide private club[s]." 5 The final draft of the exemption excluded "private
club[s] or establishment[s] not in fact open to the public."5 This change
was best explained by Senator Long:
Its purpose is to make it clear that the test of whether a private club
... is exempt from Title II, relates to whether it is, in fact, a private
club, or whether it is, in fact, an establishment not open to the pub-
lic. It does not relate to whatever purpose or animus the organizers
may have had in mind when they originally brought the organiza-
tion or establishment into existence.52
Senator Humphrey viewed the exemption as protecting only "the genu-
ine privacy of private clubs or other establishments whose membership is
genuinely selective on some reasonable basis."'53 Although these remarks
are general, they illustrate the need for judicial probing of the actual opera-
tions of clubs claiming exemption.
48. 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
49. Id. at 302.
50. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. § 201(e) (1963).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e).
52. 110 CONG. REC. 13,697 (1964) (statement of Sen. Long).
53. 110 CONG. REC. 13,697 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey); see supra note 46 for Sen.
Magnuson's remarks. Although Sen. Magnuson indicated the importance of selectivity in deter-
mining what is a private club, he stated that a number of variables must be considered in light of
the "clear purpose" of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to protect the genuine privacy of private clubs.
See 110 CONG. REC. 7407 (1964).
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B. State: Private Club Exemption
State public accommodation statutes are patterned after Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.14 However, they have greater latitude for a
number of reasons: 1) states have a greater ability to outlaw private dis-
crimination because they are not limited by the commerce clause;55 and 2)
states have the right, because of the increased state interest in its residents,
to enact and enforce laws that are more restrictive than federal legislation.
In other words, the Constitution establishes the base below which state leg-
islation must not fall. The ultimate authority of the states is subject to the
constitutional rights of privacy and association. 6
1. State Compelling Interest
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees57 the Supreme Court recognized that
the "archaic and overbroad" assumptions based on gender actually "de-
prive[ ] [individuals] of their [personal] dignity and den[y] society the bene-
fits of wide [and diverse] participation in political, economic, and cultural
life. '' 58  To enhance protection of individual rights, many states have
adopted a functional definition of public accommodations and established
exemptions which reach various forms of public, quasi-commercial and pri-
vate conduct. This definition reflects the changing nature of national and
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a. It should be noted that state public accommodation statutes also
have exemption clauses for private clubs and nonprofit organizations.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c) states: "The operations of an establishment affect commerce within
the meaning of this subchapter if . . . [f]or purposes of this section, 'commerce' means travel,
trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several [s]tates, or between
the District of Columbia and any [s]tate, or between any foreign country or any territory ......
Id. (emphasis added).
56. The reference to constitutional rights is evidenced in 15 AM. JUR. 2D, Civil Rights § 1, at
281-82 (1984), where "civil rights" is defined as:
[T]he enjoyment of such guaranties as are contained in constitutional or statutory law,
such as the [f]irst [a]mendment right of free expression, and the precious rights of personal
liberty which such [a]mendment protects, or, more specifically, to the guaranties found in
the civil rights amendments to the Federal Constitution and federal statutes enacted pursu-
ant thereto,.., designed to prevent discrimination in the treatment of persons by reason of
their race, color, sex, age, religion, previous condition of servitude, or national origin.
Id.
57. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
58. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (the Court noted that discrimi-
nation based on overbroad assumptions about the relative needs and capacities of sexes forces
individuals to labor under stereotypical notions that often bear no relationship to their actual
abilities); see also Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984); Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). Freedom of expression is not an absolute right. Both the United
States Constitution and Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 neglect to establish guidelines to
provide more widespread equality among Americans as well as ensure more even distribution of
the protection of rights.
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state economies and removes barriers to economic advancement and polit-
ical and social integration that have historically plagued certain minority
groups.
59
Since courts have acknowledged that the right to associate for expres-
sive purposes is not absolute, infringements on that right may be justified by
state statutory regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests that
cannot be achieved through less restrictive means. Courts do not enforce
and uphold state statutes which aim at the suppression of speech, are not
"viewpoint neutral,"6 ° permit enforcement authorities to enforce the stat-
ute through use of unconstitutional criteria, and/or hamper the organiza-
tion or club's ability to express its protected views. State public
accommodation statutes should, instead, reflect "the [s]tate's strong histori-
cal commitment to eliminating discrimination and assuring its citizens
equal access to publicly available goods and services. ' 61
To accomplish this goal, states have progressively expanded the scope of
their public accommodation statutes with respect to the number and types
of "covered" facilities, the numbers of groups protected from discrimina-
tory practices, as well as who is exempt from statutory regulation.62 For
example, the Minnesota Legislature added discrimination on the basis of
sex to the types of prohibited conduct in its public accommodation stat-
ute. 63 The result of state statutory prohibition of such discrimination in
places of public accommodation is the increased protection of state citi-
zenry from serious social and personal harms. In contrast with Title II,
59. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622-29 (the Court applied the Minnesota Human Rights Act to
the Jaycees' activities by assuring women equal access to the benefits obtained through Jaycee
participation, and found that the state had advanced state interests through the least restrictive
means available); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (A law firm "has not
shown how its ability to fulfill [protected] function[s] would be inhibited by a requirement that it
consider [a woman lawyer] for partnership on her merits."); Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Cam-
paign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 91-92 (1982); Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex
rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 124-26 (1981).
60. In this Comment, this author will use the term "viewpoint neutral" to refer to a state
statute that does not distinguish between prohibited and permitted activity on the basis of the
separate viewpoint of each.
61. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 624 (stated goal must serve a compelling state interest of the "highest
order"). It is interesting to note that the Roberts Court decided that even if enforcement of the
state act causes some "incidental abridgement" of the Jaycees' protected rights, that effect is no
greater than is necessary to accomplish Minnesota's legitimate purposes. Id. at 628.
62. See infra notes 63 and 64 and accompanying text.
63. The Minnesota Human Rights Act provides in part: "It is an unfair discriminatory prac-
tice: [T]o deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privi-
leges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public accommodation because of race,
color, creed, religion, disability, national origin or sex." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(3) (West
Supp. 1989). "Sex" was added to the Act on May 24, 1973. 1973 Minn. Laws 2164.
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state statutes generally set forth more exact definitions for such terms as
"bona fide private club," "place," and "public accommodation." However,
statutory definitions vary to a great extent in the expressed protection af-
forded by state statutes, and in the exemptions to their coverage. A com-
parison of New York and California's public accommodation statutes will
illustrate the wide diversity in two state public accommodation statutes. 64
2. New York Public Accommodation Statutes65
The Civil Rights Law of New York provides that all persons shall be
"entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and
privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort, or amuse-
ment.",66 The purpose of the statute is to eliminate "direct or indirect dis-
crimination in public places, and prevent wherever [sic] possible social and
economic ostracism based on racial, religious, or national prejudices. 67
Provisions prohibiting discriminatory practices with respect to availability
64. Note that Wisconsin's Public Accommodation Statute, found at § 942.04(2) of the Wis-
consin Statutes, states as follows:
(2) "Public place of accommodation or amusement" shall be interpreted broadly to include,
but not be limited to, places of business or recreation, hotels, motels, resorts, restaurants,
taverns, barber or cosmetologist aestheticians, electrologist or manicuring establishments,
nursing homes, clinics, hospitals, cemeteries, and any place where accommodations,
amusement, goods or services are available either free or for a consideration except where
provided by bona fide private, nonprofit organizations or institutions.
(3) No person, club or organization may refuse to rent, charge a higher price than the
regular rate or give preferential treatment, because of sex, race, color, creed, sexual orienta-
tion, national origin or ancestry, regarding the use of any private facilities commonly
rented to the public.
Wis. STAT. § 942.04(2) (1987-88) (emphasis added).
Wisconsin is not alone in the all-encompassing nature of its statute as well as its lack of defini-
tions of such words as "place," "private facilities" or "public accommodation." See Illinois' Pub-
lic Accommodation Statute, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, para. 5-102(A)-(C) (Smith-Hurd 1989);
Nevada's Public Accommodation Statute, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 651.050-.075 (Michie 1986
& Supp. 1988); Missouri's Public Accommodation Statute, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 213.065 (Vernon
Supp. 1989).
65. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(2)(a) (Consol. 1983); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 40 (Consol.
1982), § 40(a)-(g) (Consol. Supp. 1988-89).
66. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 40 (this is part of the civil liberties statutes of New York). A
place of public accommodation has been defined, non-inclusively, as: "[i]nns, taverns, road houses,
hotels ... restaurants, or eating houses, or any place where food is sold for consumption on the
premises; [places] where spirituous or malt liquors are sold; ice cream parlors ... retail stores...
clinics, hospitals ... barber shops, beauty parlors, theatres ... amusement and recreation parks
... bowling alleys, golf courses." Id. For a complete list of public accommodations, resorts, or
amusements encompassed by the Civil Rights Law, see id. For a complete list of public accommo-
dations according to the Human Rights Law, see N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(9).
67. 18 N.Y. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 33, at 402 (1981). For a general discussion of the purpose
of this statute, see Camp-Of-The-Pines, Inc. v. New York Times Co., 184 Misc. 389, 53 N.Y.S.2d
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and operation of public accommodations on the basis of race, creed, color,
national origin, and sex are also found in the Human Rights Law of New
York.68 Both statutes exempt "distinctly private" institutions, clubs or
organizations.69
For organizations located within New York City, however, there are
stricter requirements than those set forth in the above described statutes.
The New York City Council enacted an ordinance which defines private
club status in more precise terms.70
475 (1945) (newspaper had right to edit advertisement containing the words "select clientele" in
violation of Civil Rights Law).
For an illustration of how the Civil Rights Law exemption is applied, see New York Roadrun-
ners Club v. State Div. of Human Rights, 81 A.D.2d 519, 437 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1981) (although the
Commissioner of the State Division of Human Rights found that the 1978 New York City Mara-
thon course was a "place of public accommodation" within the meaning of N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 292(9), the commissioner erred in determining that the running club which organized the mara-
thon had engaged in an unlawful discriminatory practice by not allowing individuals in wheel-
chairs to participate in the race since a marathon had historically been a "foot race" and since the
running club had not excluded other disabled individuals who could compete on foot), aff'd, 55
N.Y.2d 122, 432 N.E.2d 780, 447 N.Y.S.2d 908 (1982).
68. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(2)(a). A major distinction between the New York Human
Rights Law and the Civil Rights Law is that the former may allow restrictions based on sex to
stand if motivated by bona fide considerations of public policy. Compare N.Y. EXEC. LAW §
296(2)(b) with N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 40(c).
For an illustration of application of the New York Human Rights Law, see United States
Power Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 59 N.Y.2d 401, 452 N.E.2d 1199, 465
N.Y.S.2d 871 (1983) (a non-profit, tax-exempt foreign corporation and three of its local charter
organizations located in New York, which offered a service or accommodation to the public
through their boating courses and promotional activities, were owners of places of public accom-
modation, notwithstanding that the place of such public accommodation was not of fixed location;
moreover, the corporation and its charter organizations failed to establish that they were distinc-
tively private clubs within the statutory exclusion); see also Roberts, 468 U.S. 609; Eastern Para-
lyzed Veterans Assoc. v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 117 Misc. 2d 343, 458 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1982);
Kiwanis Club of Great Neck, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Kiwanis Int'l, 83 Misc. 2d 1075, 374
N.Y.S.2d 265 (1975), aff'd, 52 A.D.2d 906, 383 N.Y.S. 383 (1976) (mem.), aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 1034,
363 N.E.2d 1378, 395 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 859 (1977).
69. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 40 and N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(9) (Consol. 1983). Those
claiming to be within the exception as private institutions have the burden of proof, to come
within the exclusion it is necessary that the institution in question be a truly private place. Castle
Hill Beach Club, Inc. v. Arbury, 2 N.Y.2d 596, 142 N.E.2d 186, 162 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1957); see also
McKaine v. Drake Business School, Inc., 107 Misc. 241, 176 N.Y.S. 33 (1919) (school sued for
rejecting an applicant because of applicant's color had the burden of proving that it was within the
statutory exemption).
A club does not lose its exemption as a private institution on account of an occasional relaxa-
tion of its "guest" rules nor would the existence of nearby signs characterizing a club as "public"
preclude it from being private under the exemption. See Delaney v. Central Valley Golf Club,
Inc., 28 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1941), aff'd, 263 A.D. 710, 31 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1941),aff'd, 289 N.Y. 577,
43 N.E.2d 716 (1942)(mem.).
70. The local law of New York City is intended to prohibit discrimination in those clubs
which provide benefits to business entities and to persons other than their own members.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
3. New York City's Local Law No. 63
On October 9, 1984, New York City exercised its police powers by
adopting a local human rights ordinance which "forbids invidious discrimi-
nation in 'places of public accommodation', excluding 'any institution, club
or place of public accommodation which.., is in its nature distinctly pri-
vate.' ",71 The New York City Council defined "distinctly private" in Local
Law No. 63 as follows:
A club "shall not be considered in its nature distinctly private if it
[1] has more than four hundred members, [2] provides regular meal
service, and [3] regularly receives payment for dues, fees, use of
space, facilities, services, meals or beverages directly or indirectly
from or on behalf of nonmembers for the furtherance of trade or
business."72
A consortium of private clubs sought judgment declaring this ordinance
unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the holding
of the supreme court, appellate division that the ordinance was a valid con-
stitutional exercise of police power of the City of New York because it was
not pre-empted by or inconsistent with state anti-discrimination law and
did not violate the club member's right to privacy, free speech and associa-
tion under the United States Constitution.73 Local Law No. 63 is signifi-
cant in that it, along with the Civil Rights Law and Human Rights Law,
demonstrates how a state can stratify legislation to discourage discrimina-
tion in places of public accommodation and impose stricter qualifications at
the local level for procuring an exempt status.
On two occasions the New York State Club Association ("NYSCA")
was unsuccessful in its claim that this local ordinance violates members'
rights to equal protection and to freedom of association, privacy, and
speech.74 The NYSCA, however, continued its challenge. The NYSCA pe-
71. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 211, 212, 505 N.E.2d 915,
916, 513 N.Y.S.2d 349, 350 (1987), aff'd, 487 U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988) (quoting N.Y. CITY
ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-107[2], 8-102[9] (1986)).
72. Id. (quoting NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., LOCAL LAW 63 (1984), amending N.Y. CITY AD-
MIN. CODE § 8-102[9]). The New York City Council stated that Local Law No. 63 realized the
city's "'compelling interest in providing its citizens ... regardless of race, creed, color, national
origin or sex.., a fair and equal opportunity to participate in the business and professional life of
the city.'" Id. (quoting findings of the New York City Council).
73. The disposition of New York State Club Ass'n to this point is as follows: In 1986, the New
York Supreme Court Appellate Division affirmed the New York Supreme Court's decision that
the law was constitutional. See New York State Club Ass'n, 118 A.D.2d 392, 505 N.Y.S.2d 156
(1986). Then, in 1987, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed. See New York State Club Ass'n,
69 N.Y.2d 211, 505 N.E.2d 915, 513 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1987).
74. The New York Supreme Court, the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division, and
the New York Court of Appeals all held the law constitutional.
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titioned the United States Supreme Court for review of the February 7,
1987, New York Court of Appeals decision.
4. The New York State Club Association Decision
On June 20, 1988, the United States Supreme Court, in a unanimous
decision, ruled that New York City's Local Law No. 63 did not infringe
upon the NYSCA's first amendment right of free association. 7 In general,
the Court recognized that some of NYSCA's members may have been enti-
tled to constitutional protection, but it affirmed the court of appeals' en-
forcement of Local Law No. 63 because the law did not infringe upon the
associational rights of every NYSCA member.76
The Court asserted that Local Law No. 63 is not overbroad. It found
no evidence of any club, let alone a substantial number of clubs, for whom
the law impairs the ability to associate or to advocate public or private
viewpoints. 77 Rather than establish a uniform method to address such chal-
lenges, however, the court resolved that administrative and judicial oppor-
tunities were available for individual associations to contest the
constitutionality of Local Law No. 63 as it might be applied against them.
It concluded that statutory overbreadth will be curable through a case-by-
case analysis of specific facts.78
5. California Public Accommodation Statute
The California Unruh Civil Rights Act7 9 prohibits a "business establish-
ment" from engaging in discriminatory activity. For purposes of the Act,
75. New York State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 2225. Justice White delivered the
opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III, and an opinion of the Court
with respect to Part IV, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Brennan, Marshall, Black-
mun, Stevens, Kennedy, and O'Connor joined. Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion in
which Justice Kennedy joined. Justice Scalia filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
76. Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2234.
77. Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2232-35.
78. Id.; see also infra notes 96-152 and accompanying text for proposed method of evaluating
like problems.
79. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1989) (Unruh Civil Rights Act). The California Un-
ruh Civil Rights Act applies to equal rights and business establishments. The Act reads in part as
follows:
All persons within thejurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their
sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or blindness or other physical disability
are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, privileges, or services in all
business establishments of every kind whatsoever.
This section shall not be construed to confer any right or privilege on a person which is
conditioned or limited by law or which is applicable alike to persons of every sex, color,
race, religion, ancestry, national origin, or blindness or other physical disability.
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courts have defined "business" as embracing "everything about which one
can be employed."8 "Establishment" has been defined as "not only a fixed
location.., but also a permanent 'commercial force or organization' or a
'permanent settled position (as in life or business).' "' Courts have identi-
fied several "businesslike attributes" such as the complex structure of the
organization, the size of the staff and budget, and the extensiveness of the
organization's publishing activities.82
Many "business organizations" intentionally engage in service activities
which are protected by the first amendment to avoid colliding with the Un-
ruh Act. The United States Supreme Court interpreted the Act as not re-
quiring clubs to abandon or alter their regular activities, but rather to
maintain and pursue "their basic goals of humanitarian service, high ethical
standards in all vocations, goodwill and peace."83 The Supreme Court hy-
pothesized that if membership for leading business and professional women
opened up in the community, Rotary Clubs and other "business" organiza-
tions were likely to obtain a more representative cross-section of commu-
nity leaders with a more diverse attitude toward service.84
6. The Paradox of Variety
The variety of state legislative enactments and judicial construction of
statutes demonstrates the unsettled nature of the law in this area. Since
most state statutes are modeled after the federal Public Accommodation
Act, including the private club exemption, state courts have had to define
their application to determine which organizations, because of their private
nature, fall within this exemption. Some courts have interpreted the stat-
utes strictly, with results similar to cases brought under the federal law85
and state action theories.8 6 Other courts have shown an increasing willing-
Id.
80. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 542 (1987)
(citing California Court of Appeals decision in the instant case, 178 Cal. App. 3d 224 Cal. Rptr.
213 (1986)).
81. Id. (citing O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 795, 662 P.2d 427,
430, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320, 323 (1983) (quoting Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 468-69,
370 P.2d 313, 316, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609, 612 (1962)).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 548.
84. Id. at 549 n.7. Note that "[iun 1980 women were reported to make up 40.6% of the
managerial and professional labor force in the United States." Id. (quoting U.S. Department of
Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 400 (1986)).
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a.
86. The term "state action" is generally used to describe claims arising under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983) for which a
private party is seeking damages because the state has violated that party's civil rights. Common
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ness to liberally interpret public accommodation statutes to reach new defi-
nitions of public accommodations.
Due to the close parallels between federal and state public accommoda-
tion statutes, the federal standards used to determine whether clubs are pri-
vate are often used in state cases as well. It should be noted, however, that
there is no single test which can be applied and easily understood to be
determinative of whether an establishment is in fact a private club or public
accommodation. A number of factors must be examined in light of the
purpose of the federal law87 or the state public accommodation statute so as
to protect only "the genuine privacy of private clubs.., whose membership
is genuinely selective .... 88 Although it has been conclusively established
that the burden of proof rests on the one claiming the private club exempt
status, the courts have not agreed as to whether the determining test is
factual or legal.89
IV. PROBLEMS WITH AD Hoc DECISION MAKING
A. General Problems With the Current Approach
The question of whether or not a club or organization falls under the
private club exemption provokes a judicial consideration of a multitude of
factors, no one of which seems to be dispositive. Even though courts have
consistently placed greater emphasis on two or three factors,9" they most
factors used to determine if the state's action is significant for purposes of litigation include: 1)
whether the state is so entwined with the regulation of private conduct (financially or otherwise)
as to constitute state activity; 2) whether there is meaningful state involvement in the activity; and
3) whether there has been a delegation of what is traditionally a state function to a private person.
Further discussion of state action is beyond the scope of this Comment. For illustrations of
how courts use the doctrine, see Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1971); Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Smith v. Duquesne Univ., 612 F. Supp. 72
(W.D. Pa. 1985).
87. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1982).
88. Annotation, Construction and Application of§ 201(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42
US. C. § 2000a(e)), Excluding from the Act's Coverage Private Clubs and Other Establishments
Not in Fact Open to the Public, 8 A.L.R. FED. 634, 639 (1971) (quoting 110 CONG. Ruc. 13,697
(1964)).
89. For a detailed discussion of who carries the burden, see Jordan, 302 F. Supp. 370 (E.D.
La. 1969); United States v. Richberg, 398 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1968); Daniel, 395 F.2d 118.
The Jordan court held that such a determination of a club's status is a factual one. Jordan,
302 F. Supp. at 375. On the other hand, the Richberg court held that such a determination is a
question of law. Richberg, 398 F.2d 523.
90. The three factors most often considered by the courts are: 1) the selectiveness of the
group in the admission of members; 2) the existence of formal membership procedures; and 3) the
degree of membership control over internal governance, particularly with respect to admission of
new members and revocation of membership rights. For further discussion of these factors and
other factors, see infra notes 121-52 and accompanying text.
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frequently take an ad hoc approach in deciding whether a club is in fact
private.9 This method inevitably leads to inconsistent results, as well as
preemption by the judiciary of the legislature's role,92 and pre-emption of
the state courts by the federal courts.9 3 In several cases the decisions cate-
gorized like-factors to achieve a more systematic approach. In other cases
the courts applied those factors it determined were appropriate to a given
set of facts to reach an outcome.
The solution to these inconsistent results is the application of a "thresh-
old" test. This method would require the court to decide a specific legal
issue and synthesize94 facts to produce a "thorough," "fair" and "well-rea-
soned" result. When courts engage in a complete "interest analysis"95 at
four separate stages, those interests with legitimate goals and objectives will
91. Most recently, the Supreme Court admitted that statutory overbreadth issues must be
decided on a case-by-case basis. See New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S.
__, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2235 (1988) (The Court concluded that "whatever breadth may exist should
be cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact situations to which its sanctions, assertedly, may
not be applied." Id. (quoting Breadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615-16 (1973)).
92. "The obligation of the judiciary is to give that meaning (of 'a place of public accommoda-
tion') to words accorded by common experience and understanding. To go beyond this is to
intrude upon the policy-making function of the legislature." United States Jaycees v. McClure,
305 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Minn. 1981) (Sheran, J., dissenting). In a caveat to Cornelius v. Benevolent
Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182, 1204 (D. Conn. 1974), the district court stated that
the "immunity" it gave to the Elks Club is limited. The court demonstrated how legislative regu-
lations and laws will prohibit the club from acting in a discriminatory fashion. The court noted
that if the Elks deviated from "approved" activities, they stood to forfeit state aid. Furthermore,
if a club promoted prejudice for profit, it would cease to be exempt under Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Finally, the court stated that clubs must operate as extensions of members'
homes, not extensions of their businesses where prejudice would affect channels of commerce. Id.
93. See Kiwanis Int'l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 806 F.2d 468, 477 (3d Cir. 1986), reh'g
denied, 811 F.2d 247, cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1050 (1987)(The construction of a New Jersey
statute by a federal court "must be controlled by the New Jersey court's construction of its own
legislation."); see also National Surety Corp. v. Midland Bank, 551 F.2d 21, 29 (3d Cir. 1977)
(quoting Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) which states: "[W]hile the
decrees of 'lower state courts' should be 'attributed some weight.., the decision [is] not control-
ling . . .' where the highest court of the State has not spoken on the point.").
These courts propose that an intermediate appellate court holding is merely presumptive evi-
dence, rather than an absolute declaration, of state law. Therefore, if a state court has not thor-
oughly interpreted and documented the law passed by the state legislature, other courts are not
bound to follow the appellate court's "statement of law."
94. "Synthesize" in this context means to combine all applicable factors together.
95. The "interest analysis" looks at the interests of the plaintiff, defendant, judicial system,
and the public. The plaintiff's interest is to remove discriminatory practices by clubs and organi-
zations and to restore equal opportunity. The defendant wants the court to enforce the constitu-
tional right of freedom of association and enjoin the plaintiff from gaining entrance to its
organization. The courts' goal is to utilize the most consistent, thorough and well-reasoned
method possible to reach an equitable result and uphold the law of the land. The public wants to
ensure that we continue to live in a society which abides by the Constitution and provides oppor-
tunities for everyone which are consistent and fair.
[Vol. 72:403
PRIVATE CLUB LEGITIMATION
be furthered and protected. These thresholds are broken down into four
categories. Under the constitutional right of freedom of association, courts
must: 1) determine if the association is "intimate" or "expressive"; 2) deter-
mine if there is an applicable state statute; 3) on the conclusion that the
activity is expressive, determine whether it operates as strictly "expressive"
or "commercial" when looking at the surrounding facts and circumstances;
and 4) define the pertinent factors and characteristics that the court will
consider.
B. Threshold Analysis
1. THRESHOLD NO.1: Whether the Particular Freedom of
Association Rights Claimed by the Defendant are "Intimate"
or "Expressive"
Freedom of intimate association envelops freedoms within the penum-
bral constitutional right of privacy.96 The law recognizes that an organiza-
tion cannot claim a right of association as a result of "'marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and edu-
cation.'" 97 Such intimate associations identify certain zones of privacy
which receive the utmost in constitutional protection. In other words, if the
association is deemed "intimate" there is no room for governmental
interference.
Freedom of expressive association, however, is not so sacred. Courts
have held that freedom of association is needed to guarantee those ex-
pressed rights in the first and fourteenth amendments. 98 However, in Gil-
more v. City of Montgomery, the Supreme Court recognized that the "very
96. The Supreme Court has found privacy rights based on general principles inherent in the
Constitution. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984) ("certain
types of highly personal relationships are to be free from unwarranted state interference"); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (state abortion legislation violative of individual's privacy
rights); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-85 (1965) (receipt of information relating to
contraceptives should be "private" in order to exercise fundamental right to make procreational
choices); see also Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 635 (1980) (inti-
mate associations "have a great deal to do with the formation and shaping of an individual's sense
of his own identity").
97. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 631 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment)(quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)); see also supra notes 29-32 and accompanying
text.
98. In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor stated that "an association engaged exclusively in
protected expression enjoys First Amendment protection of both the content of its message and
the choice of its members." Roberts, 468 U.S. at 633; see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 784-85 (1978) ("In the realm of protected speech, the legislature is constitutionally disquali-
fied from dictating . . . the speakers who may address a public issue.") (citing Police Dept. of
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)).
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exercise of the freedom to associate by some may serve to infringe that free-
dom for others."99 Determining the limits of governmental authority over
an organization's freedom to engage in particular association is not an easy
task. The Supreme Court found that this process "unavoidably entails a
careful asses~ment of where that relationship's objective characteristics lo-
cate it on a spectrum from the most intimate to the most attenuated of
personal [relationships]."'" In this spectrum and subsequent enforcement
of constitutional rights, complete consideration of all of the thresholds is
required before reaching a decision.
2. THRESHOLD NO. 2: Is There a State Public Accommodation
Statute, Human Rights Act, Civil Rights Act or Other Type
of Legislation Which Purports to Ensure Equal
Rights and Equal Access for All?
If the answer to this threshold question is "NO," then Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, more specifically 42 U.S.C. 2000a(a)-(e), will ap-
ply.' 0 ' If the answer is "YES," then the court must go on to ask: Is the
organization seeking the exempt status a place of public accommodation
within the meaning of the state statute? There are a number of approaches
which the court may take to analyze this issue. Three approaches which
are uniquely similar as well as different are: The Fixed Situs Approach;
The Public Business Facility Approach; and The Fletcher Approach.
a. Fixed Situs Approach
In National Organization for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc.,1°2
which involved a challenge to all-male baseball programs, Little League as-
serted that it was not a place of public accommodation within the meaning
of the New Jersey statute because it did not "operate from [a] fixed parcel of
real estate .. . of which it had exclusive possession by ownership or
lease."' 13 The court held that Little League was a place of public accom-
modation because the invitation to participate in its activities is "open to
99. 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974); see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,
907-09 (1982) (NAACP launched a boycott, supported by speeches and non-violent picketing, of
white merchants); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-46 (1982) (State Charitable Solicitations
Act found to grant denominational preferences and was therefore held to violate the first
amendment).
100. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620 (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 187-89 (1976) (Pow-
ell, J., concurring)).
101. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 201, 78 Stat. 243 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (1982)).
102. 127 N.J. Super. 522, 318 A.2d 33 (1974), aff'd, 67 N.J. 320, 338 A.2d 198 (1974).
103. Id. at 530, 318 A.2d at 37.
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children in the community at large, with no restriction (other than sex)
whatever."' I 4 The court stressed that the term "place" is a term of conven-
ience, not limitation, and used to "reflect the fact that public accommoda-
tions are commonly provided at fixed 'places'." 10 5
Some state public accommodation statutes contain "laundry lists" of the
locations wherein a membership club or like organization may not discrimi-
nate. 106 A statutorily-required fixed location leaves loopholes for member-
ship clubs to avoid following public accommodation provisions. For
example, a club may adopt certain physical characteristics, not included in
the expressed "list," to circumvent enforcement of the statute upon it. In-
ternal activities, however, may not be truly private. To avoid this problem,
many states have broadened their statutory language to "de-emphasize" the
role of the fixed situs.
b. The Public Business Facility Approach
The Minnesota Human Rights Act 1°7 defines the phrase "place of pub-
lic accommodation" as "a business, accommodation, refreshment, en-
tertainment, recreation or transportation facility of any kind . . . whose
goods, services, facilities.., or accommodations are extended.., or other-
wise made available to the public." 108  Under this statute the process of
104. Id. at 531, 318 A.2d at 37-38. The court indicated that the "place" in this case is the
ballfield where tryouts are arranged, instructions are given, practices are held and games are
played. The court went on to note that the Little League was public in the sense that local govern-
mental bodies make the playing areas available to local leagues without charge. Id.
105. Id. at 530, 318 A.2d at 37. The court illustrated this point with such examples as hotels,
restaurants, and swimming pools. The court also recognized that a train was a place of public
accommodation even though it has a moving situs. Id.
106. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.300 (14) (Supp. 1988). The Alaska statute defines a
"public accommodation" as:
[A] place that caters or offers its services, goods or facilities to the general public and
includes a public inn, restaurant, eating house, hotel, motel, soda fountain, soft drink par-
lor, tavern, night club, roadhouse, place where food or spirituous or malt liquors are sold
for consumption, trailer park, resort, campground, barber shop, beauty parlor, bathroom,
resthouse, theater, swimming pool, skating rink, golf course, cafe, ice cream parlor, trans-
portation company and all other public amusement and business establishments, subject
only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons.
Id.
107. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01(18) (West Supp. 1989).
108. Id. (emphasis added). California's and Minnesota's Public Accommodation Statutes
also regulate business establishments; see supra notes 63 and 91 and accompanying text; see also
Don Wilson Builders v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. App. 2d 77, 33 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1963).
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determining if an organization (i.e. Jaycees, Kiwanis, Rotary or Lions Club)
is a public business facility involves a three-prong approach."9
First, the court must address whether the national organization is a
business. In United States Jaycees v. McClure, ° the Supreme Court of
Minnesota analyzed how the national organization treated its current and
prospective members. It concluded that the Jaycees regarded its members
more as customers than as owners of the organization. I I Furthermore, the
suggested sales approach to potential members ("Jaycees, the product you
are selling. . .")" turned out to be soliciting membership in an organiza-
tion whose goal is to advance its members. The court concluded that the
sale of individual memberships placed the national organization into a
"business" classification.
Using the second prong, the court considers whether the national organ-
ization is a public business. Courts have consistently used two criteria to
decide whether a group is private or public: 1) selectiveness of the organiza-
tion in the admission of members; and 2) limits on the size of member-
ship.13 A national organization whose only act of selectiveness is
categorizing its members into one of two groups (i.e. associate membership
versus regular membership) is not legitimately selective. The initial process
of admitting members into the organization must be selective. Internal pro-
cedures thereafter are irrelevant. The McClure court found that more than
eighty percent of a Jaycees officer's time is devoted to "spurring" the sale of
memberships. Also, the Committee Chairman's Workbook declared that
the "Jaycees are in the People business - not the project business."' "' Ad-
ditionally, the court determined that more than half of the organization's
"achievement" awards are based, in part, on the number of new members
recruited. Thus, according to the Minnesota Supreme Court, an unselec-
tive, energetic sale of memberships will undoubtedly place an organization
into a public business classification." 5
The third and final consideration is whether the organization is a public
business facility. The term "business facility" generally means a business at
109. For a complete analysis of this three-prong "public business facility" approach, see
United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 768-74 (Minn. 1981).
110. 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981).
111. Id. According to the McClure court, the Jaycees' Officers & Directors' Guide referred to
members as the officers' customers. Id.
112. Id. at 769 (citing the Jaycees' Recruitment Manual) (emphasis added).
113. See Nesmith v. YMCA, 397 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1968); Cornelius, 382 F. Supp. 1182. For
a more elaborate discussion on these two factors, see infra notes 139-47 and accompanying text.
114. McClure, 305 N.W.2d at 771 (quoting the Committee Chairman's Workbook) (emphasis
in original).
115. For the court's analysis of these two factors, see Id. at 770-71.
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a physical location within the state which invites the general public and
solicits members from a fixed spot. In McClure, the court creatively defined
"public business facility" as follows: "Leadership skills are 'goods,' busi-
ness contacts and employment promotions are 'privileges' and 'advan-
tages,' and each site in the State of Minnesota where the sale of those
'goods' is solicited, promoted, and consummated is unquestionably a 'busi-
ness facility.' "116 In sum, a meeting place wherein an unscreened, unselec-
tive, and unlimited number of persons is invited constitutes a public
business facility." 7
c. The Fletcher Approach
In a case before it, the Massachusetts Commission on Discrimination
applied a special test to determine whether a club or organization was a
place of public accommodation. Its conclusions were produced in Fletcher
v. United States Jaycees.118 In the first step, the Commission looked to see
if the organization's offices and activities were located and generated from a
certain building. Second, the organization had to demonstrate that mem-
bership acceptance was in fact selective rather than a "community-wide"
attempt to recruit, and that the organization was a self-supporting group
rather than one which relied on public funds. Finally, a location must offer
a service to the public to be a public accommodation. The public offering
may be indirect. For example, an organization which offers to its members
personal development of their business and professional careers, indirectly
benefits the public. " 9 In theory, people who belong to these clubs will offer
to the public a more innovative and educated product.
116. Id. at 772. The court relied on Little League Baseball, Inc, 127 N.J. Super. 522, 318
A.2d 33, for its reasoning regarding the situs of the club. The court illustrated several "mobile"
locations which were business facilities: door-to-door and company-to-company solicitation of
members for the organization. Cf. First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 137 (1969) (ar-
mored car picking up merchants' cash boxes and checks is both a branch bank and a place of
business).
117. It is interesting to note that courts since 1898 have defined the term "facility" even more
liberally than McClure. For a discussion of other definitions of this term, see Cheney v. Tolliver,
234 Ark. 973, 977, 356 S.W.2d 636, 639 (1962) ("facilities" not restricted to inanimate things);
State ex rel. Knight v. Cave, 20 Mont. 468, 52 P. 200 (1898) (teachers can be considered "facili-
ties"); Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 193 Wis. 538, 547, 213 N.W. 633, 636
(1927) ("facilities" include human agencies).
118. 3 MDLR 1036 (1981), cited in Goodwin, supra note 16, at 275 n.264. For a complete
analysis of this decision, see Goodwin, supra note 16, at 275-79.
119. Goodwin, supra note 16, at 275-76. It is interesting to note that the public accommoda-
tion statute of Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 92A (West Supp. 1989), does
not have a "private club" exemption. Massachusetts' courts use factors invoked by states with
such exemptions to determine whether a "place" in their state is a public accommodation.
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If the court determines, by applying one of the above tests, or a different
test, that the club fits the definition of a public accommodation, then it has
the duty to require the organization to comply with the statute. 1 20 If such a
determination is not made, then, before the court considers whether a par-
ticular association is sufficiently private, it must determine whether the
form of activity is "expressive" or "commercial." Failure to determine if
the organization's activity is "commercial," before analyzing the objective
factors, results in inconsistent results and a waste of judicial time.
3. THRESHOLD NO.3: Whether the Type of Association in Which
the Organization is Engaged is "Commercial" or
"Expressive?"
The third threshold provides a significant focus for the court's overall
consideration of the possibility of the organization qualifying as a private
club. Defining the organization's type of expression at the outset is impor-
tant because it affects the "tests" and "factors" which the court will apply
to reach its final determination. 121
a. Choosing the Right Market
It is important that an organization choose its market. Once it enters the
marketplace of commerce, it loses the complete control and constitutional
protection over its membership that it would otherwise have if it restricted
its activities to the "marketplace of ideas."
Business is often conducted and professional contacts initiated and re-
newed at private clubs. Sensitive to these activities, "public accommoda-
tion" legislation strives to prohibit discrimination in such clubs wherein
benefits are given to business entities and to persons other than their own
members. Such generosity leads to forfeiture of private club status.12 2
120. When a court decides that the club fits within the definition of "public accommodation,"
the defendant-club often relies, in the alternative, on the due process concerns of the void-for-
vagueness doctrine which strikes down statutes that are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
For further discussion of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, see Roberts, 468 U.S. at 629-31;
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983) (in the context of a penal statute); Little League
Baseball, Inc., 127 N.J. Super. 522, 318 A.2d 33.
121. For a complete discussion on "expressive" association, see supra notes 34-36 and accom-
panying text.
122. For an illustration of such legislation, see NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., LOCAL LAW 63
(1984) (cited in New York State Club Ass'n, 69 N.Y.2d at 212, 505 N.E.2d at 915, 513 N.Y.S.2d at
350).
The New York City Council concluded that the "denial of access to club facilities constitutes a
significant barrier to the professional advancement of women and minorities since business trans-
actions are often conducted in such clubs, and personal contacts valuable for business purposes,
[Vol. 72:403
PRIVATE CLUB LEGITIMATION
Courts have recognized that business advantages afforded by members
in an organization are not merely incidental. Oftentimes, business concerns
are the motivating factor in joining a club because business opportunities
are gained by the members and capitalized upon by them. For example, in
Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte,123 the
Court noted with approval the California Court of Appeal's finding that
members receive "copies of the Rotary magazine and numerous other Ro-
tary publications, are entitled to wear.., the Rotary emblem, and may
attend conferences that teach managerial and professional techniques." '24
b. "'Affecting Commerce"
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964125 provides a very broad defini-
tion of "affecting commerce." '126 Courts have regularly held that a profit-
making establishment without member-ownership or regular dues is not ex-
empt from the public accommodations act on the ground that it is more like
a commercial enterprise than a bona fide private club.127 Moreover, in the
landmark case of Daniel v. Paul,128 Justice Black, in his dissent, warned
that an extension of the principle of "commerce" set forth by the majority
would "[stretch] the Commerce Clause so as to give the Federal Govern-
ment complete control over every little remote ... place of recreation in
every nook and cranny .... ""I
Not all courts have followed the majority in Daniel. In Graham v. Kold
Kist Beverage Ice, Inc.,130 the court actually held that a "corporation en-
gaged in the wholesale business of selling commercial equipment at whole-
employment and professional advancement are formed." New York State Club Ass'n, 69 N.Y.2d
at 212, 505 N.E.2d at 916-17, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 350.
123. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
124. Id. at 543.
125. See specifically 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1982).
126. See supra note 41. Cases since the Act's enactment have broadly construed the statutory
guidelines. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
127. See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 634-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 628-33
(1980); United States v. Richberg, 398 F.2d 523, 529 (5th Cir. 1968) ("A club is a pluralistic
enterprise. . . . It cannot be one man's principality or domain.") (citations omitted); United
States v. Jack Sabin's Private Club, 265 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. La. 1967).
128. 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
129. Id. at 315 (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see United States v. Women's Sports-
wear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949) ("If it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it
does not matter how local the operation which applies the squeeze.").
130. 43 Or. App. 1037, 607 P.2d 759 (1979).
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sale for use in retail stores. . ." is not engaged in the sale of "public" goods,
is not a "public accommodation" and does not affect commerce."'
c. Regulation for Commercial Association
There is only minimal constitutional protection of the freedom of com-
mercial association. Some constitutional protection of commercial speech
is available, however, for purposes of promoting a commercial transaction
with the speaker. 132
Federal courts generally apply minimal first amendment protection to
commercial activity; a statute which infringes upon commercial activity will
be upheld if it is rationally related to the end result. 33 In other words,
government regulation of commercial recruitment of new members, stock-
holders, customers, and membership dues is valid "if rationally related to
the government's ends." 1 34
Deciding just how much of an association's involvement in commercial
activity is enough to restrict the association's first amendment right to con-
trol its membership cannot be easily reduced to a formula. In reality even
the most expressive of associations is likely to affect commerce. Justice
O'Connor, in her concurring opinion in Roberts v. United States Jaycees,135
stated her view as follows:
[A]n association should be characterized as commercial, and there-
fore subject to rationally related state regulation of its membership
and other associational activity, when, and only when, the associa-
tion's activities are not predominantly the type protected by the
First Amendment. It is only when the association is predominantly
engaged in protected expression that state regulation of its member-
131. Id. at 1042, 607 P.2d at 762. The wholesaler in this case agreed to sell its ice machines
to plaintiff and then refused because plaintiff was black.
132. The following illustrations may clarify: Practicing law to advance social goals may be
protected speech, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-31 (1963), but ordinary commercial law
practice is not protected, Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984). In addition, group
refusal to act for political purposes may be protected speech, but a similar boycott for purposes of
maintaining a cartel is not. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 913-14.
For a detailed explanation of commercial association and examples of its application to the
field of law and to labor union activity, see Roberts, 468 U.S. at 631-40 (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
133. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 634 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
134. Id. at 635. State regulations of purely expressive activity must be reasonable, content-
neutral regulation of the time, place, and manner of the organization's relationship with its mem-
bers, and be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Id. at 634; see also Secretary of
State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 960-61 (1984); Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at
636-37.
135. 468 U.S. 609 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
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ship will necessarily affect, change.., or silence one collective voice
that would otherwise be heard.'36
It is evident that courts must distinguish non-expressive (i.e. commer-
cial) association from expressive association and, therefore, recognize that
the former lacks the constitutional protections possessed by the latter. If
the organization is to maintain its private club status, it must demonstrate
compliance with the tests and standards which are outlined in the next
section.
4. THRESHOLD NO.4: Whether the Court Performed a Thorough
Analysis of the Public Club Characteristics?
To determine whether a particular organization is sufficiently private to
receive constitutional protection, a court must consider a variety of factors,
some of which carry more weight than others. The judiciary has examined
only a few factors - selectivity, size, and control - to determine if an
organization deserves private club status. This method bypasses the critique
of other very important considerations which would lead to a more sound
and thoroughly reasoned decision. The results of a more complete and de-
tailed application of factors would be: greater public approval, fewer ap-
peals, advance notice to defendant-organizations of the requirements to be
met, and stronger foundation upon which plaintiffs can base their com-
plaints.' 37 This Comment will present an illustrative analysis of three such
factors. There are, of course, others which courts must not ignore. 138
a. Inquiry Into Membership Requirements
The most important point of inquiry is into the membership policies of
the alleged private club. In other words, a court must dissect factors which
determine whether the membership is genuinely selective on some sound
136. Id. at 635-36.
137. For an excellent analysis of the relevant inquiries which the court should make in each
instance, see United States v. Jordan, 302 F. Supp. 370, 375-76 (E.D. La. 1969).
138. This Comment will focus on "membership practices," "size," and "manner and purpose
of operations." Other important factors include: formalities which the club observes (i.e. bylaws,
annual meetings, maintenance of minutes of such meetings), general characteristics which private
clubs may or may not possess (i.e. non-profit versus profit oriented nature, public advertisements,
outside sponsorships, listing in the phone book, special license and tax benefits), and whether the
club engages in practices discouraging minorities from trying to join with a comparison of private
club with like places in the near vicinity (i.e. purposes, activities, opportunities offered by each).
For a thorough analysis of factors, see Jordan, 302 F. Supp. at 370.
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basis. If there are no established criteria for selecting members, courts are
reluctant to accept the claim of private club status.
139
An important aspect of this broad category deals with the amount of
control the members have over admission, recommendation, and revocation
processes."'4 It is essential that the court look for a well-organized and
structured admission system. Certain issues should be addressed each time
the court reviews a claim: Does the organization place greater emphasis on
quantity or quality of members?"' Does a representative "committee,"
chosen by the members, select new members? Do the members receive no-
tice of pending membership applications and rejections? Do existing mem-
bers provide personal recommendations to applications? If so, are existing
members permitted to recommend and/or endorse minorities? Is there a
"disciplinary committee" which, with the use of a set of rules, reviews
problems and makes appropriate revocation decisions? Are there any genu-
ine qualifications for membership?' 42
A second aspect of "control" is related to who regulates the operations
of the establishment, and who or what provides the funds for such opera-
tions. Courts must determine whether the members own the club's prop-
erty, and whether the members retain the revenue. If the club is operated
for a profit (i.e. a commercial enterprise operated for the benefit of one per-
son or select group), then it is not a private club. 143
The most direct evidence of a club's selectivity and control is its past
record of rejections and acceptances. Minimum refusal of applicants with
particular backgrounds constitutes prima facia evidence of non-selectivity.
For example, the Supreme Court examined the practices of the United
States Jaycees and decided that they were unselective. In 1981, the United
States Jaycees organization had about 295,000 members (regular and asso-
ciate) in 7400 local chapters. There were no female regular members. Yet,
139. See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620; Nesmith, 397 F.2d at 101-02; Jordan, 302 F. Supp. at
375; see also Note, The Private Club Exemption to the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Study in Judicial
Confusion, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1112, 1122-27 (1969).
140. Another aspect of control deals with who controls the operations of the establishment.
Courts should look at whether the members exercise complete control over the operations. In
other words, records of the organization should reveal the owner of the property which houses the
facilities, how revenue is spent, if regular dues are paid, and if the organization receives specific
tax breaks due to its status.
141. Kiwanis Int'l, 806 F.2d at 474 (citing McClure, 305 N.W.2d at 771).
142. Such qualifications may contain the following: residence in a particular location, posi-
tion in a particular social class, good reputation or character, balance between number of appli-
cants rejected and number accepted. For further illustrations, see 302 F. Supp at 375.
143. See Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1152 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
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almost every male member who applied for admission was accepted. Out of
approximately 11,900 associate members, only two percent were women. 1
44
b. Inquiry Into Size of Organization
The size of the organization's membership usually sets the stage for ju-
dicial review of the entire operation. Courts are more apt to grant private
club status to a small, stable organization with a cap built into the accept-
ance program. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, a local subsidiary of Kiwanis In-
ternational, was granted immunity by the court due to its size and practices
to remain small. 145 The local club was composed of only twenty-eight
members, ten of whom were members for more than twenty years. Every
prospective member had to be sponsored by an existing member. Although
the international organization encouraged large-scale solicitation of new
members, the "mailings" were sent only to known prospects. The largest
membership drive performed by the local club sought only to elicit interest
in the club, not to promise membership.
Contrast Kiwanis International with Board of Directors of Rotary Inter-
national v. Rotary Club of Duarte,14 6 where the Supreme Court was asked
to uphold California's Unruh Civil Rights Act which prohibited local clubs
from excluding women. The Court reviewed the evidence and concluded
that the local club was not in fact "private." It based its conclusion on the
following factors: 1) the size of the local clubs across the country ranged
from approximately twenty members to more than nine hundred members;
2) there existed no upper limit on the membership; 3) the annual attrition
rate in the local clubs was approximately ten percent. To compensate for
loss in members, the local clubs were "instructed to 'keep a flow of pros-
pects coming' to make up for" the loss and enlarge the base. 147
Another consideration relevant to size is the limitation of membership
in any way other than its relationship to the size of the facility. Much can
be inferred from comparing the difference between the size of the organiza-
tion and the pool from which the members were drawn.
144. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 613.
145. See Kiwanis Int'l, 806 F.2d at 475-76. Contrast Ridgewood Kiwanis Club which has
only 28 members, with Kiwanis International, which is composed of more than 313,000 members.
Id. at 469.
146. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
147. Id. at 546 (quoting 2 Rotary Basic Library Club Service 9-11, app. 88).
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c. Manner in Which the Organization Was Created
The courts must consider the fact that organizations may engage in cer-
tain activities in order to qualify for private club status. In United States v.
Jordan,148 "Landry's Fine Foods and Restaurant" converted itself into
"Landry's Private Dining Club, Inc." in order to discriminate against
blacks. The District Court of Louisiana determined that the purpose of the
converted private club was no different than the purposes of the restaurant
which preceded it. Furthermore, membership in the converted club was
solicited in an unrestricted and nonselective manner from only white cus-
tomers of the former restaurant. 149 The court examined the alleged reasons
for the "conversion" to determine whether the alleged purpose of the club,
a desire to keep out trouble makers and "riff-raff," could be accomplished
through less restrictive means. 5° It held that the converted club did not
qualify as an exemption, granted injunctive relief, and forced the club to
restore an open-door policy.'
In Kiwanis International, the court of appeals disagreed with the district
court's conclusion that the club's practice of conducting meetings in public
restaurants qualified it as a public accommodation. It concluded that the
district court failed to look at the subject matter of the meetings or at the
group which attended these meetings. The court of appeals held that mem-
bership organizations do not become public accommodations just because
they conduct meetings in public places. Further, instead of placing empha-
sis on where the gathering takes place, greater scrutiny need be given to
whether the invited members came from an unrestricted and unselected
pool and whether the meeting is in fact open to the public at large.152
V. CONCLUSION
Freedom of association is currently being tugged in two directions by
conflicting interests.' 53 In one direction, individuals who are striving to-
148. 302 F. Supp. 370 (E.D. La. 1969).
149. Id. at 373.
150. Id. at 376-78; see also Richberg, 398 F.2d at 527-29 (A cafe cannot, by drafting itself a
set of bylaws, become an exempt club. In determining whether the cafe has been, in fact, trans-
formed into an exempt club, the court must consider such matters as the similarity of operations
before and after the club's transformation, whether all profits from the operation go directly to
benefit the owner, whether there is total absence of club meetings, and whether there is a lack of
genuinely collective action surrounding the acceptance of new members.).
151. Jordan, 302 F. Supp. at 379-80.
152. Kiwanis Int'l, 806 F.2d at 474-75; see also Little League Baseball, Inc., 127 N.J. Super. at
522, 318 A.2d at 33.
153. See Goodwin, supra note 16, at 270 (freedom of association is restricted by "counter-
vailing interests").
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ward equal access and opportunity want courts to prohibit private club dis-
crimination. In the other direction, clubs and organizations claim their
constitutional right of association protects their business, political, social,
cultural, and educational goals.
It is recognized that some private clubs challenged under public accom-
modation statutes are superficial shams and can easily be categorized as
public accommodations. If this were the case for all clubs, couts could
easily draw a line between shams and truly private organizations to deter-
mine eligibility for the exemption. However, this is not the case. There
have been, are currently, and always will be those close cases which will
require courts to focus conceptually on the nature of the private
organization.
Application of an ad hoe approach to determine the status of the close
cases has lead to inconsistent results. The solution is a comprehensive
scheme of thresholds which balance the rights of the group against the
rights of the individual. The threshold method presented herein requires
the court to concentrate on one legal issue at a time and synthesize its facts
to produce a thorough and well-reasoned result. In addition, both federal
and state legislatures can set forth stricter requirements that must be ful-
filed to qualify as a private club. The approach embodied in New York
City's Local Law No. 63 provides an excellent model for other jurisdictions
seeking to balance the individual's right of equal access to public accommo-
dations against the club's freedom of association and right to selective
membership. 154
JULIE A. MOEGENBURG
154. For a discussion of the balancing of interests, see Note, supra note 7.
1989]
